popular will consistently and continuously for long periods of time. 26 This is true even when judicial activism was allegedly most rampant in American history. 27 Yet whether judicial review in nascent democracies functions in the same way it does in old democracies has so far not been lucidly articulated. Most new democracies were previously authoritarian regimes, which could lead to two paradigms of judicial review. They could be more counter-majoritarian since they are established in the hope of protecting discrete and insular minorities. This function is particularly crucial in new democracies where democratic institutions are not fully mature, and the tyranny of majority is therefore more likely to occur. Contrarily, it could also be more deferential to the majority since the judiciary has not established its authority and supremacy, 28 and thus has more incentives to rule in favor of the majority. 29 With these two possibilities, it remains largely unanswered how judicial review in new democracies will behave.
Based on the development of the Constitutional Court in Taiwan [hereinafter the 279, 283-86, 291-294 (1957) (arguing that "it would be most unrealistic to suppose that the Court would, for more than a few years at most, stand against any major alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority"); JACK M. BALKIN, THE LIVING ORIGINALISM 287-93 (2011) (elucidating that although the counter-majoritarian assumption is wrong, the judiciary is not simply a mirror of public opinion, either); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH 185 (2006) 30 It is noteworthy that in Taiwan there is also a Supreme Court, which is the last resort of all civil and criminal controversies. In order not to confuse the two, "the Court" in this paper always refers to the Constitutional Court, which has the final say over all constitutional issues. When mentioning the Supreme Court in Taiwan, I will always use "the Supreme Court."
progressively and democratically, nullifying a constellation of laws that violated human rights during the authoritarian period. 31 In other words, most of the laws declared unconstitutional were extremely unpopular. Hence, this paper argues that judicial review in Taiwan is indispensible precisely because the Court has exercised the power of judicial review in a majoritarian way. Sometimes, the Court may be even more democratically responsive than a legislative branch paralyzed by factional conflicts or sectarian interests. In short, judicial review in Taiwan is susceptible to public opinion, which makes it majoritarian, rather than counter-majoritarian.
It is worth noting that public opinion may affect judicial review both directly and indirectly. 32 Justices, however insulated institutionally from outside pressure, are still part of society. 33 Any event may influence the justices' personal attitudes and public opinion simultaneously, which means the causal relationship, if any, between public opinion and decisions could be confounding and spurious. 34 Therefore, this paper does not argue that justices in Taiwan render decisions based on any public opinion poll. Rather, it argues that the decisions they deliver are usually consistent with the majority, and tries to explain why.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part II examines three pieces of evidence that support the thesis of this paper. First of all, the docket record of the Court demonstrates that it seldom rules against the current majority. Empirical evidence shows that most laws declared unconstitutional were enacted by a congressional majority no longer in power at the time of the case. Secondly, when public opinion is unclear or divided, the Court simply refuses to hear related cases in order to avoid being embroiled in contentious issues. The issues of death penalty and gay marriage exemplify this strategic agenda-setting. Finally, the paper analyzes two critical cases in which laws with quasi-constitutional status were declared unconstitutional. At first blush, nothing could seem more counter-majoritarian than nullifying constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, the two decisions, as well as the why would judicial review in Taiwan be majoritarian if justices are not elected officers? Institutional, political, and historical factors account for this counter intuitive argument. Part IV discusses the relationship between the majoritarian Court and its ability to bring about political and social change. It also analyzes the likelihood a majoritarian court to change society compared to counter-majoritarian courts.
II. Majoritarian Judicial Review in Taiwan
Before examining to what extent judicial review in Taiwan is majoritarian, it is helpful to briefly introduce the system of judicial review in Taiwan. judiciary also needs public support to check and balance the other two branches. It is in this sense that the judiciary needs its own broadly defined constituency. 43 Given that fact, whether the Court is counter-majoritarian is worth discussing. The following paragraphs demonstrate how the Court has wielded the power of judicial review democratically from three angles: the docket records, judicial agenda-setting, and case studies.
Docket Records
In practice, when the judiciary strikes a law down, it does not necessarily follow that the judiciary is at odds with current majority opinion, that is, counter-majoritarian, unless the law still reflects the contemporary and national majority opinion. 44 This is because there surely will be a time lag between the enactment of laws and the promulgation of decisions. The longer the time lag, the more tenuous the relationship between the law and popular will can become. The landmark privacy case Griswold v.
Connecticut, 45 for instance, is one telling example, in which the law stricken down had no longer represented the majority opinion in Connecticut when the decision was delivered. 46 Nor did it represent the consensus of national majority. In other words, it would require more elaboration before labeling these kinds of decisions as anti-democratic. With this caveat in mind, the following paragraphs empirically examine whether, and to what extent, the alleged counter-majoritarian difficulty overshadows the Court. The basic presumption is that statutes enacted by sitting legislators better represent current majority opinion among citizens than those enacted decades ago.
Since Taiwan's democratization, the Court has issued about 500 decisions, in which more than 150 statutes and administrative regulations are ruled repugnant to the Constitution and void. 47 However, the temporal interval between the enactment and nullification of a law varies significantly. Some laws are annulled almost immediately after they are promulgated. It is plausible to argue that the Court rules against the current majority in such scenario. By contrast, at the opposite side of the spectrum, there was an extreme case in which the constitutionally problematic statute remained valid for three-quarters of a century before being declared unconstitutional. In the latter case, it would be exceedingly difficult to argue that the statute at issue still represented public opinion. Taiwan serve a renewable three-year term. Consequently, the preliminary assumption is that the Court rules inconsistent with public opinion when the interval is less than three years. The longer the span is, the less likely it is that the Court is acting in a counter-majoritarian manner. There are a total of 78 statutes that have been expressly declared unconstitutional by the Court in the 74 decisions made since democratization. In these cases, the average interval between a statute being enacted and being annulled is roughly 16 years. Table 1 shows that in only about one-fifth of the cases did the Court declare a law enacted less than three years previously unconstitutional. This fraction (20.5%) is a proxy, albeit imperfect, that suggests how infrequently the Court rules against the majority. By contrast, in 79.5 percent of the cases, it is plausible to argue that the Court does not rule against the current majority based on the amount of time passed between enacting and annulling the statute. In addition, the cases in which statutes stricken down are enacted over twenty years ago occupy more than one-fourth of the court docket. In these circumstances, it is highly questionable whether the exercise of judicial review could be branded as counter-majoritarian. Furthermore, this majoritarian propensity seems to be commonplace even among justices of different terms. Neither the fifth-term nor the sixth-term justices seem to rule against the majority frequently; justices nominated after 2003 are no exception. Even justices of the sixth term, usually regarded as most active, rule against the majority in less than one-third of the cases. In other words, generally speaking, the Court is deferential to the majority in power.
By the same token, Table II shows the temporal interval between the enactment and nullification of administrative regulations that are successfully challenged in the Court. It is noteworthy that, unlike legislators, the president serves a four-year term in Taiwan, and may be reelected once. Therefore, the Court ruling is most likely inconsistent with public opinion when the interval is less than four years in the context of administrative regulations. Similarly, the longer the interval, the less likely it is that the Court should be accused of being counter-majoritarian. with current majority.
Furthermore, empirical statistics demonstrate that most cases remain in lower courts for less than 3 years (or 4 years in the context of regulations). Specifically, people usually spend 2.9 years in lower courts before they challenge the statutes in the Court. 58 When the laws at issue are administrative regulations, people usually spend 3.34 years. Firstly, it is noteworthy that the two figures (2.9 and 3.3) are smaller than the term of legislators and presidents. This implies that constitutionally problematic laws will often be challenged in the Court before the current majority changes, which further strengthens the validity of the proxy. Besides, even if we take this time lag into account and loosen the definition of counter-majoritarian cases, Table I Critics may further argue that the decisions that strike down laws enacted decades ago could still be categorized as counter-majoritarian since public opinion may last for a long time. On the one hand, since the laws being stricken down are, on average, enacted 16 years ago (almost one generation), it is likely that public opinion has changed on many issues given this long time span. 64 In addition, legislators can attack the Court if these laws, enacted decades ago, still represent mainstream opinions. Historically, the legislators did attack the Court several times when it issued unpopular constitutional interpretations. It would be plausible to argue that those decisions are not counter-majoritarian if there is no such legislative reprisal.
As to the third inquiry, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate with surgical precision the cost the congress is willing to bear. Besides, the cost may vary from time to time, depending on political environment, distribution of congressional seats among different parties, and the attitudes of other political actors.
In this regard, it is theoretically possible that the Court is slightly more Last but not least, it is worth noting that even if the Court strikes down laws enacted in recent years, the decisions are not necessarily at odds with majority opinion.
It could be there is no discernible majoritarian opinion at all due to some legislative institutional defects. 65 It could also be that legislators may intentionally invite justices to issue their opinions regarding thorny issues in order to shift political responsibility. 66 This interaction can be observed when other structural limitations occur, such as federalism, entrenched interests, and factions. 67 In these circumstances, it would be unfair to condemn judicial review as anti-democratic since they are merely the scapegoat of the political branches.
Case Studies
In addition to empirical evidence, case studies also indicate that public opinion plays a significant role during the judicial decision-making process. This is especially true in major cases that attract the attention of most, if not all, Taiwanese people at a certain time. The following section introduces two cardinal cases critical to the political and constitutional development of Taiwan. In the first case, the Court struck down the Temporary Provision, a law with quasi-constitutional status; in the second case, the 1999 constitutional amendments were stricken down. At first blush, it seems that the Court behaves in a "counter-super majoritarian" way since it strikes down not statutes but constitutional laws. Nevertheless, the Court would have not been able to render these two pivotal decisions without the support of public opinion and political elites. Moreover, the majoritarian propensity of the Court can also be observed from some cases with respect to fundamental rights. longer tolerable to postpone the election indefinitely, the Court proclaimed that a nationwide election should be held as soon as possible for the maintenance of the constitutional system. 71 The KMT party that enacted the Temporal Provision was still the ruling party that controlled both the executive and the legislative at that time. At first blush, it seems that the Court made a very bold decision, ruling against the majority by striking down a quasi-constitutional law.
Nevertheless, the outcome was a political corollary if one takes the historical context into account. At that time, the first-term national representatives had remained in power without democratic legitimacy for forty years due to the suspension of the national election. The outcry against these representatives and the thirst for democracy were so intense that it quickly became a national consensus to replace them. Even the ruling KMT party did not support these unpopular representatives, and the opposition party had attacked them strongly. In fact, the ruling KMT elites strategically invited the justices to solve this hot potato for them since it would be embarrassing for the ruling KMT elites to force their KMT representatives to retire.
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One former justice that participated in this decision later confirmed that these representatives had already become a burden to the ruling party. 73 He also acknowledged that this Interpretation exemplified the judicialization of politics, and defended it on the ground that a constitution was essentially political. 74 The promulgation of this decision has multiple implications for the purpose of this paper. First of all, it is clear that the support of public opinion and political elites was indispensible to this iconic decision. Without that support, it is inconceivable that the deferential Court would dare to nullify the Provisions that governed Taiwan for forty years during the authoritarian era. Secondly, the Court established its own supremacy and popularity by striking down the Temporary Provisions that ruled Taiwan for four decades. As the Court's popularity grew, so did its authority. In the democratic period, the Court realized that it should be deferential, not to the autocrat, but to the will of people, especially when social consensus is formidable. beginning, but it is clear that public opinion was overwhelmingly against the prolongation of the term. It is plausible to assume this strong dissatisfaction affected the attitudes of political elites, who in turn decided to bring the case to the Court. By the time that the case was debated in the Court, it is relatively clear that the Court had won the support of both public opinion and politicians. The decision, although it nullified constitutional amendments, was consonant with most people's expectations.
Again, the Court further entrenched its prestige and supremacy by delivering a decision that was ostensibly counter-majoritarian but majoritarian in reality.
C. Morality Cases
In addition to separation-of-powers cases, the Court takes public opinion into account in fundamental rights cases as well, especially cases regarding sexual morality. Generally speaking, Taiwan is still a morally conservative country. Sexual transactions are strictly prohibited; diversity of sexual orientation has not been fully respected. Not to mention that adultery is still criminalized. This conservative propensity is reflected in many decisions the Court has rendered. In this area, the Given these decisions, it is clear the Court stands by the congressional majority in the realm of electoral law, aiming to support a two-party political system. This is of course preferable to the leading two political parties, which further demonstrates the majoritarian propensity of the Court. But for those discrete and insular minorities, this is hardly a good sign.
Agenda Setting
The third evidence is the Court's agenda-setting power: the Court exercises its discretion by avoiding being embroiled in highly contentious issues in which public opinion is highly divided. also intentionally decide not to hear a case when it is believed that he or she would lose merit. 88 Unsurprisingly, it is also possible for the justice to decide to hear cases even though he or she wants to affirm. 89 Externally, the stances of other branches are also influential when a court exercises this agenda-setting power. 90 For instance, opinions of the Solicitor General have been highly respected by the U.S. Supreme
Court at both decision-making and certiorari-granting stages. 91 Interest groups also play an important role in shaping the judicial agenda by filing amicus briefs.
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This agenda-setting power is derived from two factors. The first one is the broad discretion the highest court usually enjoys in deciding its docket. When disputes are extremely thorny or public opinion is highly divided, the judiciary may decide not to hear the cases lest it stands by the wrong side. Secondly, this power is also made possible by the symbiotic interaction between a court and its petitioners since a court needs to rely on litigants to set its agenda. 93 This is especially telling when the petitioners are the coordinate branches. Elected officials usually encounter divided, sometimes even antagonistic, opinions from their constituents, which may prevent them from taking a clear stance on certain issues. In these circumstances, the existence of an independent judiciary becomes a "boon" 94 to these officials since they may shift the responsibilities to these unelected justices. The more accustomed politicians are to shifting blame, the more discretion the judiciary can exercise in setting its agenda.
Like its American counterpart, the Court has wide discretion in setting its own agenda, and the process has so far been shrouded in complete secrecy. Theoretically speaking, national courts that adopt abstract review, such as the Court, have more leeway in setting their agenda. 95 In practice, the Court did repeatedly announce that "the subject matter evaluated is not limited to that specified in the petition, but may include the laws and orders adopted to reach the final verdict and those closely related requested for interpretation in the petition." 96 The Court can examine the constitutionality of any law so long as there is a "close relationship" between the law and the case in hand. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court never clearly defines what counts as "close relationship," which in practice vests the Court with greater agenda-setting power.
This agenda-setting power can be further analyzed by examining its two elements: the cases it decides to hear and the cases it decides not to hear. As will be discussed later, the Court had a crisis of legitimacy after democratization due to its past submissive image during the authoritarian regime. Therefore, it changed the composition of its docket dramatically by using its agenda-setting power. During its first three terms, when Taiwan demonstrates that the judiciary is attentive to public opinion, even though it is supposed to be independent of the majority.
Summary
From previous paragraphs, it is clear that the Court is in line with the majority most of the time. It seems that the counter-majoritarian difficulty does not exist in Taiwan. To be sure, some may criticize that there are still cases in which unelected justices rule against to the majority.
This may be explained by its diffuse support. 107 Both politicians and lay people have incentives to tolerate a somewhat precarious court so long as it by and large remains within the "zone of acquiescence." 108 Politicians may hope that the Court may serve as insurance after they are no longer in power. 109 499, all other separation-of-powers cases occurred during periods of divided government-that is, when the legislative and the executive were controlled by different parties. When a party controls both the executive and the legislative, it is clear that the ruling party represents the majority of public opinion, at least in theory.
Under this circumstance, a majoritarian court, such as the Court, will be less likely to rule against the majority since the will of the people is quite clear. Contrarily, when the government is divided, either the congressional majority or the president can represent the true public opinion. It could also be that public opinion is highly divided, and there is no stable majority. Given that, justices are less constrained by public opinion and more likely to rule against the congressional majority since the Court is still supported by the president, who also represents the majority.
Secondly, it is intriguing that the Court is more majoritarian in the field of fundamental rights than in the area of separation-of-powers. This finding is contradictory to the general expectation of a constitutional court, which is supposed to function as a guardian for human rights, protecting discrete and insular minorities from majority tyranny. On the one hand, it seems to further support the insurance theory of judicial review 115 in which the losing party regards judicial review as a mechanism to protect itself from being retaliated against by the new winning coalition.
On the other hand, this finding may lead to a controversial debate with respect to whether courts can bring about social change. 116 The records of the Court examined seems to imply that losers in the congress hall will still be losers in the court room since the Court seldom defies the current congressional majority in the domain of fundamental rights. Some may contend that the Court did strike down many laws that infringed human rights after democratization. Although this counterargument is true insofar as the Court does have a brilliant record in striking down laws violating human rights, its decisions are usually consistent with the majority opinion. Elected branches should have revised these outdated laws before they were challenged in the Court, since the social consensus had already changed before the intervention of the Court. In this sense, other factors outside the courtroom have contributed to the social change; the Court merely reflects it.
Finally, the agenda-setting power of the Court as well as case studies suggest that the popularity and supremacy of the Court derive from the dynamic interaction between the Court and public opinion: when the congressional majority fails to reflect public opinion by revising outdated laws, the Court progressively strikes them down in the name of the Constitution; when the congressional majority newly enacts laws, the Court respects the collective decision of the elected representatives; and when public opinion is divided and represented by both the congress and the president, the Court has the most leeway in determining whether, and how, to render a decision.
III. Why Majoritarian?
Based on previous analyses, judicial review in Taiwan 
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Constrained by these institutional limitations, judicial review tends to be more majoritarian than some students of judicial review may believe. This is plausible even in old democracies.
Moreover, judicial review in new democracies does have some unique characteristics that may make it less likely to be counter-majoritarian. Before the transition from autocracy to democracy, the judiciary in authoritarian regimes is usually unable to resist the will of the dictator. analyze why judicial review in Taiwan is majoritarian through three different factors.
Institutional Factors 119
Beginning with the nomination and confirmation process, there are various institutional factors that cause the judiciary to act in a majoritarian manner. To begin with, each justice must be nominated by a president and confirmed by the majority of congress before he or she serves on the bench. Since both the president and the legislators are elected and face the pressure of reelection, they unavoidably take public opinion into account when exercising their powers of nomination or confirmation. 120 This process makes justices more likely to be majoritarian, 121 even though the majority does not directly elect them. Namely, the president is unlikely to choose an extremist as a candidate, and the congress is equally unlikely to confirm such a candidate. 122 In addition, nominees usually grow up in upper-middle class families, are trained to become lawyers in reputable law schools, , and share similar values with mainstream society.
Even if a justice sometimes does not hold the majority viewpoint, the composition of a high court prevents him or her from acting solely of his or her own will. Unlike some judges in lower courts, justices of a high court make decisions collectively. They have to negotiate, compromise, and collaborate with their colleagues until an internal majority is formed. 123 More often than not, the stance of a moderate justice (usually the median or swing justice) is adopted as court opinion. 124 And since the stance of each justice generally reflects different attitudes within society, the moderate typically does not deviate from mainstream society too far. Hence, this collective decision-making procedure also renders a high court majoritarian. In a similar vein, another internal factor that may force a court to be more majoritarian is the quorum requirement for making decisions. Not all high courts require only simple majority to promulgate a decision. Compared with simple-majority quorum, a supermajority quorum makes judicial review less likely to frustrate the congressional majority. Once a decision is delivered, it will be more majoritarian since it is unlikely that a supermajority of justices will disregard or misjudge public opinion.
Besides, the most critical defect of judicial power is the lack of implementing ability. 125 To make its judgments function as the supreme law of the land in practice, the judiciary unavoidably needs to take into account the reaction of coordinate branches, 126 lower courts, 127 and public opinion. 128 Other branches may have no power to overrule a constitutional decision once delivered, but they can passively refuse to implement it. In the American context, the resistance of southern states against Brown v. Board of Education 129 is a telling example. 130 This is not to say that the judiciary should always follow the step of mainstream society, but there is certainly some resistance when a court walks too fast or too slow.
Finally, not all justices around the globe are life-tenured. It is likely that the shorter the term is, the more susceptible to public opinion justices have to be in the hope of being re-nominated or finding a new job elsewhere.
In Taiwan, justices of the Court are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese equivalent of Congress. Historically, either the Control Yuan or the National Assembly had exercised the confirmation power since they were once "considered as equivalent to the parliaments of democratic nations." 131 No matter which body exercises the confirmation power, it has always been monopolized by the parliament. This institutional factor is designed to ensure that the will of the people prevails. In Interpretation No. 541, the justices plainly acknowledge this point by maintaining, "it is clear that while the nomination of the President of the Judicial Yuan, the Vice (Deputy) President of the Judicial Yuan and the Grand Justices falls within the executive power of the President, the power of consent or veto shall be exercised by a government agency in accordance with the will of the people. This is the legislative intent of the Constitution and its Amendments" (emphasis added). 132 Furthermore, justices in Taiwan do not have life tenure. All justices nominated before 1997 served a fixed and renewable term of nine years; 133 justices nominated since 1997 serve a staggered, non-renewable term of eight years. This institutional design of a staggered, eight-year term ensures that every president can nominate at least some justices in his her term since the presidential election is held every four years. In this regard, it makes the Court more majoritarian in two ways. First, justices of the Court have more incentives to rule in line with the majority because there are less constitutionally insulated from the society. 134 Second, it also means that the Court will always comprise of some justices nominated and confirmed by the latest political majority.
Besides, a supermajority of justices is required to deliver a constitutional interpretation in Taiwan. Specifically, a decision needs two-thirds of the votes (three-fourths before 1993) to become the supreme law of the land. This high threshold makes it less likely for justices to rule against the congressional majority.
Finally, there is no guarantee that every decision the Court issues will be faithfully implemented by coordinate branches and other courts. Historically, several
Interpretations were not implemented for over a decade, and clashes between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court in Taiwan had taken place several times.
Political Factors
Although it is hard to impeach a Justice, elected branches usually have many other methods of disciplining the judiciary when needed. 135 For example, the congress may cut the budget, limit the jurisdiction, lower the number of staff members, or raise the quorum required to render decisions of the court. In addition, the executive may refuse to implement unpopular decisions, or even try to pack a high court. Accordingly, although the conventional wisdom is that the judiciary is independent of public opinion, it in fact is not. Contrarily, public support is extremely important for the judiciary. 136 Although public opinion acts as an external constraint on the judiciary, it simultaneously undergirds its legitimacy. 137 As public support of the judiciary changes, the interaction between the judiciary and other political branches differs as well. When the popular support is low, for example, the judiciary either remains silent or becomes submissive to the executive. Only after the authority of the Court was gradually accepted and entrenched at the late stage of transition did its decisions become respected and implemented. The shift from transitional-court model to ordinary-court model was a process in which the judiciary gradually entrenched its authority and popularity among public opinion.
This is not to say that the Court never misjudged its popularity and power. In In this regard, the Court is literally the least dangerous of the three branches.
Only by rendering majoritarian decisions can it defend itself in the name of public support.
Historical Factors
Institutional and political factors may be influential in shaping the Court's opinions, but history is the most critical one that makes the Court more willing to constitutionality in the Court. The political approach was, however, not efficient owing to a variety of reasons, including filibusters, bribes, and factions. The democracy was not fully mature: legislators threw shoes, climbed on desks, and had fistfights in the assembly hall. Clearly, most people were disappointed at these national representatives. They turned to the once toothless judiciary in the hope of eradicating past wrongs. This time, the judiciary grasped the opportunity and functioned actively by striking down unpopular laws, most of which were enacted decades previously. By striking down these laws, the Court exercised the power of judicial review in an active and majoritarian way that was consistent with people's expectations. Contrary to conventional wisdom, its passive self-restraint in the past was in fact counter-majoritarian.
Given this history, judicial review today is majoritarian and welcomed by
Taiwanese people because the laws it strikes down are often repugnant to the will of the people. Judicial activism has never been a serious problem in Taiwan. It is not unreasonable to believe that judicial review became popular after democratization precisely because of judicial activism and judicial supremacy. 146 Of course, whether this kind of judicial review can be categorized as judicial activism in a traditional sense is another issue. The point here is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, judicial review in Taiwan is majoritarian precisely because it substantially intervenes in the political process in which elected branches are often paralyzed by political antagonism and stalemate. Its timely intervention not only restores people's confidence in the judiciary, but also leads, at least ostensibly, to crucial political and social change in Taiwan.
IV. Majoritarian Courts and Social Change
One of the key questions in law and politics is: can courts bring about social change? 147 There are many theories of evaluating judicial impact. 148 There were little, if any, ideological differences between the two major parties regarding whether or how the Court should protect human rights, which also explains why the Court could function independently. In short, the crisis of judicial legitimacy and the popularity of these decisions helped the Court to overcome the first obstacle by ruling for citizens instead of for political parties.
The same rationale explains how the Court solved the implementation problem.
Since most decisions directly related to fundamental rights were ignored during the authoritarian era, public opinion tended to press newly elected representatives to implement these decisions once they were promulgated. Political elites generally did not resist these decisions, partly because there was little dissent among political elites over the rulings. 155 Besides, politicians could claim credit by supporting these decisions. At the early stage of transition, no promising politician would risk his or her political career by blocking these highly acclaimed and popular decisions. Indeed, it could also be that the party in power supported the policy by inviting the Court to render decisions that were consistent with its interests. Thus, by shifting the blame to Finally, these decisions were widely supported by both politicians and citizens.
Their popularity among lay people is understandable, since a large proportion were human rights cases decided in favor of petitioners. As for politicians, members of the opposition party welcomed these decisions since they expanded the protection of political rights, such as freedom of association and the right of election, which substantially advanced their political agenda. 158 On the other hand, members of the ruling party did not resist these popular decisions since they also needed public support to compete with the opposition party.
In a nutshell, immediately after the lifting of martial law, the Court did bring about political and social change in the fields that garnered a national consensus, such as political liberalization and protection of human rights. With the Court overcoming these numerous hurdles, the litigation strategy must have been effective and efficient.
Interpretation No. 261 and other fundamental rights cases from this time exemplify
this point. It successfully ended the prolongation of the first-term national representatives and required the government to hold national elections, which terminated the forty-year authoritarian period.
Democratization Stage
As Taiwan gradually became a fully democratized country, it became increasingly difficult for the Court to bring about political and social change. All of the conditions for the Court to overcome the said three obstacles during the transitional period either disappeared or weakened as time go by.
First of all, it has become difficult for justices to vote impartially since the confirmation process for justices has become much more politicized since the party turnover in 2000. 159 Since then, political conflict between the two major parties has 156 See supra note 72-74 and accompanying text. 157 HIRSCHL, supra note 9, at 148 (arguing that judicial interpretation of negative liberties "has the potential to plant the seeds of social change"). 158 All in all, in a highly divided society, there is no single majority, but rather many pluralities. Without clear and strong support from the majority, it is difficult, if not impossible to garner national consensus. Accordingly, any decision the Court issues will face strong opposition from opponents, which makes it unlikely for the Court to bring about social change alone in the future. What is worse, given the past records discussed above, it is not likely that the majoritarian Court will stand by the minorities. In other words, losers in the congress will probably still be losers in the courtrooms.
Admittedly, the definition of "political and social change" could have multiple interpretations. 160 Critics argue that a traditional court-centered framework overly narrows and underestimates the causality and impact of judicial decisions. properly. 163 It is even possible that losing a case in court will still lead to some social or political changes. 164 As indicated earlier, however, a comprehensive study of courts and social change it beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that compared to other courts, it is less likely for a majoritarian court, such as the Court, to bring about political and social change, however defined, since it will more often than not follow mainstream society at the expense of the minority.
V. Conclusion
This paper tries to demonstrate that the Court is indeed a majoritarian court from three perspectives: docket records, agenda-setting, and case studies. I argue that the Interpretations are consistent with public opinion most of the time in the sense that the Court rarely resists the contemporary congressional majority. It did occasionally rule against the current majority, but more often in separation-of-powers cases than in fundamental-rights cases. 165 Institutional, political, and historical factors all account for why the Court is majoritarian, rather than counter-majoritarian. Accordingly I argue that judicial supremacy exists in Taiwan, but only in accordance with the majority. 166 This also explains why most Taiwanese people, including constitutional scholars, do not worry about judicial activism. Comparing to those proposals about judicial minimalism, popular constitutionalism, or departmentalism in the United
States, this contrast is particularly stark. In Taiwan, judicial self-constraint, championed in many other countries as a virtue, is indeed counter-majoritarian. This characteristic directly affects the likelihood that the Court will bring about political and social change in the future.
In new democracies, courts are usually expected to eradicate past wrongs and bring about significant change in the political arena, 167 and Taiwan is no exception.
When there is social consensus, and when the political branches fail to work properly, 168 it is relatively easy to bring about political and social change through litigation. Contrarily, when public opinion is divided or opposed to change, there is little reason to believe that the judiciary can actively create the tide of change alone.
The performance of the Court before and after democratization seems to support this argument. Besides, it is possible that the more political a court becomes, the more representative and majoritarian it will be. 169 Given this, with the increasingly politicized nomination and confirmation processes seen in Taiwan in recent years, it seems pessimistic that the Court can play a role in leading political and social change.
Being an old constitutional court in a new democracy, scholars have had different evaluations of the Court's performance after democratization. Some believe it is cautious, 170 while others contend it is relatively active. 171 At first blush, the two arguments seem to be contradictory. Nevertheless, they are two sides of the same coin.
In other words, public opinion contributes both to the activeness and cautiousness of the Court. It is active when it realizes it is backed by public opinion; it is cautious when a divided public opinion is transformed into a political clash. Whether this majoritarian judiciary is peculiar in Taiwan, or it is common among new democracies, remains not crystal clear so far. It is possible, however, that courts in new democracies
